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.II 
uH.PT~R I 
INTRODUCTION 
The National Association of Manufacturers is a group of 
16,000 firms dominated by a minority which is numbered at most in 
the hundreds. 1 It is run by the top executives of the latter group. 
This small group of individuals appears to exert a tremendous in-
fluence on American thinking and American legislation. It uses 
such methods as pressure on Congress through testimony before 
Congressional committees and through lobbying activities. The 
ground which this paper will attempt to cover will deal with the 
Taft-Hartley Law and attempts to revise it. 
N. A. M. activity reached a high point in 1947, prior to 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act. What was the effect of 
N. A. M. activity on the enactment of that law and in the eriod 
following? To lThat extent did N. A. M. philosophy enter the Act? 
How effective were N. A. M. exertions against the drive to repeal 
:1 the Act? These are the questions which this paper will deal with, 
using the following methodology. 
The methods I have adopted may be divided primarily into 
I three parts. First is an analysis of N. A. M. labor hilosophy 
1 
Cleveland, A. S., • A. M., Spokesman for Industry?, Harvard Business 
Review, ol. 26, p. 353-371, May 1948 
1. 
I. 
II 
and legislative desires, as expressed both in hearings before 
Congressional committees and in official platforms and Association 
iterature. Second is a study of post-World War II labor legis-
lation and bills. An attempt is made at correl~ting N. A. M. 
wishes and recent legislation in order to discover the incidence 
of acceptance of N. A. M. views in the latter. Some evidence has 
been included relating to N. A. M. participation in the drawing up 
of the Hartley Bill. N. A. M. testimony before Congress after the 
passage of the Taft-Hartley Act is looked at to see to what extent 
Taft-Hartley failed to satisfy N. A. M. desires. The attitude of 
the unions is also presented so that a clearer picture of the 
struggle may be obtained. 
Finally, the labor activities of the Eighty-First Congress 
are analyzed in order to note the degree of success of N. A. M. 
activities at a time when public opinion appeared to be against 
those parts of the Taft-Hartley Law which expressed N. A. M. 
philosophy. The final correlation is thus between the labor bills 
introduced in Congress in 1949 and N. A. M. philosophy. 
It is oped th t this paper will show that: 1) N. A. M. 
desires that the severest type of restrictions be placed on labor, 
and 2) N. A. M. influence on the labor policy of the United States 
has been far out of proportion to that which it should be in a 
2. 

Chapter II 
TESTIMO OF I RA ~10SHER BEFORE THE SENATE LABOR 
COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTIETH CONGRESS 
Testifying before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public 
Welfare, Ira Mosher, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the National 
Association of Manufacturers, presented industry's argument in favor of 
curbing the growing power of American labor unions. This labor committee 
had been holding hearings from January to April, 1947, for the pnrpose 
of formulating new labor legislation. Testimony given included that of 
fourteen re resentatives of the National Association of Manufacturers 
3 
and affiliated firms. In addition to Mr. Ira Mosher, speaking for the 
N. A. M. itself, two representatives of organizations directly affiliated 
and subordinate to the N. A. M. in the National Industrial Council, I 
testified. These were Mr. Edwards of the National Electrical Manufacturers , 
Association, and Mr. Craigmile of the Illinois Manufacturers Association. 
Representatives of members of the • A. M. Board of Directors that 
testified included Mr. Bleicher of the De. Soto Corporation, Mr. Sharp, 
General Counsel of Jones and Laughlin Corporation, Charles E. Wilson of 
General Motors, and the Vice-Rresident an G~ e-rt 1 .., ::ol..h-tSel or-' t he 
3 
Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare hearings , Eightieth Congress 
First Session, Labor Relations Program, Parts 1-5 , · pril, 1947 
-1 . 
Chrysler Corporation. Also testifying was Leo Wolman, Columbia Professor 
and well-known spokesman for N. A. M. philosophy. 
On February 15, Ira Mosher appeared before the Labor Committee 
for the prupose of urging the passage of a piece of labor legislation 
that wou d restrict"monopoly unionism''. He testified as Chair.n.a.n of the 
Executive Committee of the N. A. M. He is also Vice-Chairman of the 
N. A. M. Legislative Policy Committee. The testimony of theN. _. M. 
affiliates mentioned above coincided to• a l arge extent with that of 
Mr. Mosher. Since Mr. Mosher, as the only official N9 A. M. re resenta-
tive, sums up the arguments of the others, his testimony alone will be 
analyzed. 
Mr. Mosher's testimony, for purposes of analysis, may be divided 
into three parts: general statements as toN. A. M. principles with 
regard to business, labor, and the public; obstacles in the way of ideal 
employer-employee relationships; the urging of legislation to relieve 
these alleged obstacles, with specific recommendations. 
General Statements. 
In his general statements, Mr. Mosher first attempts to put 
himself in the position of being the spokesman, not for the big 
industrial firms, but for the thousands of small firms employing less 
than five hundred people, who compose seventy-five per cent of N. A. M. 
membership. The small companies, he maintains, have suffered most under 
the old labor laws (the Clayton, the Norris-Laguardia, s.nd the agner Acts) '' 
and therefore he is taking their pa~t. He next states that he is also 
~­
;:) . 



Taft mentioned that in the bill as it stood at the time, the boycott 
was legal in a case where employees ~efuse to cross picket lines estab-
lished by a union rep~esenting a majority of thL employees of the plant 
where the picket line is, Mosher questioned the wisdom of excepting 
even that situation. 
Mosher next talks about unfair union objectives. Here he refers 
to Jurisdictional strikes7 , sympathy strikes8 , strikes against the 
government, and strikes to force an employer to violate the law, force 
the recognition of an uncertified union, enforce featherbedding9, or 
strikes in violation of contract. Mosher says, "They are not legitimate 
·union activities •••• They do not do anybody any good---the union member 
least of all". He asks for the following remedies: 1. Permit the 
employer full freedom to discipline and discharge thosw who participate 
in or instigate these activities. 2. Withdraw the protection of the 
Wagner Act and the Norris-Laguardia Act from those who engage in or 
instigate those actions. 3. Enable those who are damaged by such 
actions to recover through civil suits against the individuals involved, 
and if such actions are sponsored directly or instigated by a union, 
against the union itself. 
7 
A strike arising over a dispute between unions as to which union has 
jurisdiction over a particular job. It is an attem t to force an em-
ployer to give the job to a particular union. 
8 
A strike by workers in Plant B to aid striking workers in Plant A by 
forcing employer B to bring pressure on employer A. 
,9 
"Featherbedding" is the forcing of an employer to hire extra workers 
for jobs which a company maintains unnecessary, such as in the case of 
a spare driver on a truck. 
9, 
On the decision to go on strike, Mosher asks that such decision 
be made by fifty-one per cent of the total number of employees in a unit, 
including non-union employees. A failure or inablity to vote is thus 
a vote against the strike. Mosher also said that he personally would 
go even further, and require the fifty-one per cent approval of the 
entire plant before any unit could strike. 
On responsibility under the law, Mosher, of course, emphasized 
his desire to have unions more accountable in the courts and more liable 
to injunction. 
Evaluation of Mosher's testimony. 
In evaluating Mr. Mosher's testimony, we see that he presents 
the gist of his testimony when he says: "Of course, all through my brief 
I am argiing for getting collective bargaining back on the plant level, 
which is the only place where it can be adequately handled". 
This is indeed the N. A. M. program, which is to destroy the 
centralized power of the union movement. Mosher's program, for instance, 
would completely disrupt the craft unions. A carpenter's local would 
no longer maintain the same wage scale for two carpenters living on the 
same street, one of whom works for company A doing the same sort of 
work the other does for company B. In the industrial unions, the powerful 
United Automobile Workers, ror example, would be split into a dozen 
different unions. It would meet a Ford or a Hoffman at the bargaining 
table with far less power than its opponent. This is beaause there 
would be a Ford Automobile Workers Union and General Motors Automobile 
Workers Union instead of a United Automobile Workers Union. 
" 
10. 

Chapter III 
INDUSTRY VERSUS LABOR; 
THE LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY LAW 
Our first step in observing the Taft-Hartley Act will be to 
trace its legislative growth and development. By doing this, wa will 
be able to see the tug-of war between labor and industry transferred 
from the industrial plant to the balls of Congress. Congressmen who 
12. 
are spokesmen for industry, and Congressman speaking for labor constituenci s, 
vie with each other for the votes of those Congressmen who are caught 
in between. Both sides appeal in the name of the"public interest". 
It will also be seen that N. A. M. desires and proposals crop up 
frequently in committee reports and proposed amendments and bills. 
The achievements of labor, however, are limited to somo slight success 
in convincing Congress to beat down by narrow margins several of the 
worst of the N. A. M.-backed proposals. 
The House and Senate labor committees held hearings from 
January to April in 1947. The first action on the floor of Congress 
was initiated on April 12, when the House committee reported out the 
Hartley labor billl0by a vote of eighteen to four.11 Principle features 
10 
11 
House Re12ort 3020 , '!:igl tieth 8or"l.::;ress , lst sess io . , 1947 
Congressional Record, Eightieth Congress, First Session, Vol. 93, p. 33 
pri l 12. 1947 
of this bill were the banning of the closed shop, regulations to prevent 
Communists from gaining control in unipns, and the banning of most. 
industry-wide bargaining. Also, government injunctions against critical 
strikes were provided for, as well as a three-member labor-management 
relations board to replace the National Labor Relations Board. In this 
bill a clear victory for industrial spokesmen, such as Chairman Fred 
J2 Hartley himself is fairly obvious . The end of the closed shop, 
industry-wide ba.rgiaining and industry-l-Tide strikes are in high 
correlation with legislation requested by the N. A. M. 
r 
On April 17, the House voted approval of the Hartley bill, 308-107.~ 
The bill in its final form included a ban on industry->-Tide bargaining, 
jurisdictional strikes, secondary boycotts, the closed shop~ compulsory 
dues checkoff,15 and communist labor union officers. Also included 
12 
After defeat in the election of. 1938, he was chosen head of the 
Tool-Owners' Union, well-known association of industrialists. 
13 
Congressional Record, Eightieth ~ongrees, First Session, Vol. 93, p.3671 
14 
A system whereb,y the plant can hire only union members, as provided 
for in the contract wit_ ~ ~ion. 
15 
Preliminary dedu,.. ion of union dues from the payroll by the company 
in collaboration with the union. 
13. 


ending the streng~ of the national industrial union, a s the industry-
wide bargai ng ban would do. 
Senatoi T~ft' s Omnibus Labor Bill passed by a vote of sixty-eight 
20 to twenty-four on May thirteenth. In general, Administration Democrats 
voted against the bill while less loyal Southern Democrats voted for it. 
Only three of the Republicans dared to vote against Taft. These were 
Lan;:er of North Dakota, Malone of Nevada, and Wayne Morse of Oregon. 
11 Like the Hartley Bill, the Taft Bill outlawed the closed shop, banned 
communistic union officers, contained an eighty-day national emergency 
injunction, took conciliation away from the Labor Department, guaranteed 
"free speech" for employers and defined "unfair" union practices. 
The Bill now went to a Joint-Conference Committee to resolve its 
differences with the Hartley Bill. il 
I 
By a vote of seven to three the Joint-Senate House Conference 1 
Committee voted out a compromise bill. 21 In it, House conferees dropped 
their fight against industry-wide bargaining and made other concessions 
toward a union-cu:®ing bill that might survive a veto. The bill included 
a ban on the closed shop. It allowed the union shop only when all 
workers to be affected vote to demand it, and permitted .an eighty-day 
injunction against emergency strikes. It kept restrictions against the 
following : Communist union officers, secondary boycotts, jurisdictional 
strikes, and featherbedding strikes. It enlarged the National Labor 
20 
Congressional Record, Eightieth Congress, First.Session, Vol. 93, p.5117 
21 
Senate Report 510 1 Eightieth Congress, First Session 
II 
16. 



Hartley Law is in correlation with N. A. M. philosophy, point by point, 
as expressed in the committee hearings. 
I 
u 
I 
20. 
Chapter IV 
THE LAB0R-MAN~GEMENT RELATIONS ACT OF 1947 
(TAFT-HARTLEY ACT ) 
AND THE REFLECTION IN IT OF N. A. M. PHILOSOPHY 
The main provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act31 have been glim sed 
at as we discussed the passage of the Act in the receding chapter. 
In this chapter, our first job shall be to analyze more fully some of 
the main provisions of that Law which are related to N. A. M. testimony. 
~mile doing this, we will get a better idea of the full impact of the 
act as a disruptive element on unions. Correlating these provisions 
with Mr. Mosher's testimony we will see that some of them were directly 
discussed by Mr. Mosher. Others, however, while not mentioned directly 
by him at the time, reflect N. A. M. and industrialist philosophy in 
general. 32 Mr. Mosher comes out with a high batting average, at any 
rate. The effect on the American labor scene of Mosher's success can 
i be great as will be seen in the final section of this chapter. The 
status of the economic battle between management and labor must also 
be considered if we are to consider the merits of the res?ective 
arguments. 
31 
Text in Bureau of National Affairs, That New Labor Law 
32 
N. A. M. Pam hlet material, America Won't Stand for Monopoly 
I 
)1 
I 
I' 
21. 
II 
The Taft-Hartley Act. 
The Taft-Hartley Act is divided officially into five titles. 
Title I officially amends the Wagner Act, and contains primarily the 
well-known Unfair Labor Practices section. Discussing the important 
sections, we have Sec. 8a3. Control of a union with a union shop contract 
over its members is limited to discharge for non-payment of dues only. 
Also, admission to the union cannot be refused anyone. The combination 
. 
of these two means that disruptive elements within the union cannot be 
punished as long as they pay their dues. Section 8b4 prohibits a union 
from striking connected with a secondary boycott, secondary recognition 
strikes, inter-union disputes, and work task disputes. The latter 
two may be summed up in the term "jurisdictional strike". This provision 
refuses to recognize that some secondary boycotts, for example, can be 
perfectly justifiable, such as the picketing of a company ~hich is doing 
"farmed out" work for the company being struck . The actions of the 
second company have a large bearing upon the possible success of the 
strike at the first company. 33 In jurisdictional disputes, it is 
sometimes true that an employer is caught between two conflicting unions.34 
There are other times, houever, vrhen the ban on jurisdictione.l strikes 
could be used by manufacturers to force down the wage scales of higher 
paid crafts where the former should be employed; or it could be used 
merely as a disruptive device to crAate conflict among the craft unions, 
33 
Testimony of 0. A. Knight, President, World Workers International, CIO, 
1 
in J2~-committee on Labor-Management Relations Hearings , Eithtieth 
Congress, Second Session, Part 2, p. 771. 
34 
Americans Won't Stand for Monopolies, op. cit. 
22. 

practice. It will be seen shortly how this fits into the pattern. 
The section in regard to the union shop provides that it can 
only be instituted at the re uest of thirty per cent of the employees of 
the shop on a signed petition, who then gain the right to have an 
election in which an absolute majority of the total number of employees 
eligible to vote must be obtained. This, of course, does not then make 
the union shop compulsory, but merely gives the union the right to ask 
for it at the bargaining table, or strike if necessary, provided that 
various Taft-Hartley restrictions, such as the cooling-off period,are 
observed. 
Restrictions on internal union affairs are provided in Section 9f, 
which requires unions to file reports on their officers and salaries, 
union dues and fees, union methods of election of officers, membership 
lists, and a record of the disbursement of funds. This insight into 
the union machinery and possible making public of union strike funds,etc., 
can do much harm to a union undergoing a prolonged and bitter strike37 
and is ~ch welcomed by N. A. M. member firms.38 
The injunctive provisions of the Taft-Hartley Law, as regards 
unfair labor practices~9 provide for a suspension of the Norris-Laguardia 
Act so that the General Counsel of the National Labor Relations Board 
can secure a restraining order from the courts at any time after a 
charge is brought and a complaint issued. The injunction must be 
37 
CIO News, April 21, 1947, p. 7 
38 
Time, Vol. 49 , No. 26, June 30, 1947, p. l4 
39 Labor Mana ement Relations Act of 1 7Sec. S.lOe and 101. 
24. 
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Chapter V 
HEARINGS BEFORE THE "WATCH-DOG COMMITTEE 
It will be remembered tha t several business inter t~ere cited 
as indicating th~tthey thought more stringent legislation would be 
needed in the future. The Taft-Hartley Law set up a joint Congressional 
committee to study the need of further labor legislation. This committee 
held hearings from May to June, 1948. During this period, fifteen 
representatives of N. A. M., or affiliates testified for more restrictive 
labor legislation, such as the banning of industry-wide bargaining, 
and exclusion>health, welfare, and pension plans from the legitimate 
area of collective bargaining? 6 Again an official N. A. l.f. representa-
tive strikes the keynottfor the testimony of the other affilia tes • 
Official N. A. M. Testimony. 
Official testimony for the National Association of Manufacturers 
before the Joint Congressional Committee on Labor-Management Relations 
(the "watchdog" committee} ,was given by Mr. R. s. Smethurst, te§iifying 
.(C!, 7 
as the general counsel of theN. A. M., on May 26, 194~. 
66. Joint Committee on Labor-Management Relations,Heurings, Eighti ~ 
Congress, Second Session, Parts I and II, pages 1081,1062,1053,1203,1~07, 
1231,1249 and 1257 , 
Ibid., Part I , p . .LuO 
3? 
Mr. Smethurst's testimony may be divided into six parts; a 
4 
general statement, and comment on the following five points indicated 
by the committee in its request for testimony: union shop elections, 
NLRB delays, industry-wide bargaining and strikes, union welfare and 
benefit funds, and union attemtpts to force employers to violate the 
law. 
The general statement that Mr. Smethurst makes contains a 
number of themes central to N. A. M. post-Taft-Hartley Law p~losophy. 
First of all, he says, the Taft-Hartley Law has not enslaved unions. 
Secondly, there has been unusual industrial peace since the passage 
of the law. The only exception to the latter point has been in the 
case of industry-wide strikes, and here he criticizes the Law for not 
having sufficiently regulated and controlled this type of strike. 
His last point follows this line in stating that all other labor dif-
ficulties which had occurred in the preceding year had occurred in 
areas where the Taft-Hartley Law did not regul~te. 
Next, Mr. ~methurst deals at length with the problem of union 
shop elections. Answering thosE who want the union shop to be approved 
without the necessity of elections, he argues that the present case-
load burden on the NLRB is only temporary, due to the initial post-
legislation rush. He adds that elections so far have not proven that 
workers overwhelmingly favor the union shop, as alleged, since the 
elections have only been conducted in small plants at this point. At 
any rate, he explains by analogy, one does not place a man in office 
permanently because he has been elected two or three times. Mr. Smet-
38, 











The item that made the Sims bill closer to the Taft-Hartley Law 
and Wood bill than it was to original Administration proposals was its 
injunction provision. Administration forces in general and some labor 
unions had privately agreed that some further concessions might have to 
be made to get the Administration bill passed, and were willing to 
compromise on the following five po~ts: 
1. Government seizure in emergency strikes 
2. Free speech for employers during labor disputes 
3. Require both labor and management to bargain 
4. Require the filing by unions of financis.l reports. 
5. The signing of non-communist affidavits by both labor and 
management . 88 
TLe last four of the five proposals had been backed to 
the hilt by the N. A. M. The first proposal was strongly opposed by 
the Manufactureres, who felt that a provision of that type punished 
management when only labor was to blame. They advocated, therefore, 
not seizure but injunction. Speaker Rayburn complied with this desire 
by adding to the Sims bill the same Taft-Hartley-Wood provision for an 
ei!hty day injunction in national emergency strikes. For other strikes, 
a sixty day cooling off period was provided for, with enforcement of the 
provision by court order said to be implicit by some of the backers of 
The N. A. M. could claim with pride th~t even the bill of I the bill. 
the Democratic Party contained key N. A. M. principles. 
j 
I 
I 
Since the Sims bill was not approved by the President, and since 
it was obnoxious to some liberal Democrats, such as Augustine Kelley, 
floor leader of the Lesinski bill, the bill lost more Northern Democratic 
New York Times, May 8, 1949, News in Review section 
50. 
votes than it gained in Southern, r esulting in its defeat by a vote of 
211-183.89 
It was now the turn of the vlood Bill again. Coalition forces 
of the House added some softening amendments on minor provisions to 
guarantee passage. These were: Unions were given more control of their 
men in the union shop; secondary boycotts a ainst work "farmed out" by 
a struck company were allowed if provided for in the contract; the 
mandatory provision for the general counsel to seek an injunction in an 
illegal secondary boycott case was changed to a discretionary power; 
and an "economic" striker was given six months voting eligibility, 
90 1 
though he had been replaced in his job. The result of these amendments, 
which tended away from theN. A. M. point of view, was passage of the food 
91 Bill on May 3, 1949, by a vote of 217-203. Breaking down the vote, 
we find: 
Re ublicans 
Southern Democrats 
Other Democrats 
American Labor 
For 
146 
67 
4 
0 
Against92 
22 
29 
151 
l 
The role of the conservative Southern Democrat becomes obvious. 
89 
New York Times, May 8, 1949, News in Review Section 
90 
Ibid. 
91 
The Bill did not come to a vote until after the amendments were added, 
so this was the first vote on the ood Bill. 
92 
Congressional Record, op. cit , Vol. 95 , p. 5697 
51. 
Complete dicaster for Administration forces as a result of the 
above vote •ms staved off Qy the American Labor Party's Vito Marcantonio, 
>-rho, by a quick parliamentary move, succeeded in having final passage 
postponed until the following day. Hard work and many remises resulted 
the next day in a vote to recommit the whole matter back to committee. 
This was done only after a promise by the Labor Committee that it would 
write a bill that both Northern and Southern Democrats could support. 
This presumably means that it will be necessary to include some N. A. M. 
principles in the final Administration bill. Meanwhile, the Taft-Hart-
ley Law remains on the books. The vote for recommital, even at that, 
had just squeezed by by a vote of 212-209. Here is the break-down: 
93 
For Against 
Republicans 
Southern Democrats 
Other Democrats 
American Labor 
18 
38 
155 
1 
147 
61 
1 
0 
In the above vote, we see very little change over the previous 
alignment, but just enough to squeeze recommital through. Had this 
vote gone the other way, it would have meant that once _more, N. A. M. 
philosophy would have been enacted into law. The vote for recommital 
was a chanve for some Southern Democrats to go along with their party, 
without at the same time passing legislation to which industry was 
opposed. The switching of a half-dozen southern votes saved the 
Administration from complete defeat. 
93 
Congressional Record, op. cit., Vol. 95, p. - 5697 
" 
52. 
.. 
The Senate Proposals. 
The Thomas Bill. 
Let us pass now to the Senate, where the Administration 
measure is known as the Thomas Bill. Here the issue has not yet 
reached the floor of the Senate. Results in the House, however, forced 
the realization that N. A. M. and Southern Democratic influence would 
make itse~f felt in the Senate as well. On May 10, 1949, Senator 
Thomas, in an attempt at compromise that would still retain 
essential Administration bill features, expressed a willingness to 
revise his bill. Although holding fast on maintaining the spirit of 
the orris-Laguardia Act as regards injunctions, he was willing to 
com romise somewhat on the closed shop, the location of the FedeFal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service, the non-Communist affidavits and 
the obligation of both parties to .bargaln collectively.94 These 
amendments proceed a short way along the path of N. A. M. desires. 
Nevertheless, in not compromising on the injunction, and in retaining 
some closed shop features, it is a far cry from N. A. M. demands. 
Mr. Thomas also said he would rewrite the provision of his bill 
which barred states from passing anti-closed shop laws. Other con-
ciliatory features of the Thomas Bill are the banning of jurisdictional 
94 
New York Times, May 11, 1949 
53. 
II 
strikes and secondary boycotts which aren't carried on in su ort of 
wage or other economic demands. 
The Taft Bill. 
Even before the Thomas Bill had reached the floor, Senator 
Taft had introduced what he termed a compromise bill on May 4, 1949.95 
It preserved twenty-two Hartley features, while amending twenty-ei ht 
other revisions of that law. It softened the ~1ti-closed shop 
provision , as did the Wood Bill, by permitting the hiring hall arrange-
ment. It continued the arrangement of a separate Federal Mediation 
and Conciliation Service. It required both p&rties to bargain in 
good faith. he Office of General Counsel was abolished, a defet~t 
for theN. A. M. Striking workers are assured the right to vote. 
Hm,•ever, the Bill retained the use of the injunction in both national 
emergency strikes and unfair labor pr~ctice cases. Injunctions in 
the l~tter case were to be sought at the discretion of the ational 
Labor-Relations Board. 
Senate Deb-te. 
The Senate began its debate on labor legislation on Monday, June 6. 
95 
Facts on File Yearbook, 1949, P• 148 
1/ 
'I 54. 
II 
55. 
The next three weeks consisted mostly of talk, with voting on only 
a few minor amendments. Worried Administration leaders, including 
Mr. Truman himself, sh?wed signs of yielding from their previous 
stand of complete repeal without substantial modification. ~rkley 
I 
•I quoted the President as wanting the best bill he could get, and T ~ 4s 
approved for discussion at a party caucus five amendments which were 
t d by D 1 and Hill.96 Th f 11 presen e oug as ey are as o ows: 
1. Provision for plant or industry seizure, for periods up 
to 90 days, in case of a national emergency labor dispute. 
2. A guarantee of free speech for both employers and workers. 
The Administration bill covers only workers on tha t point. 
J. The filing of financial reports by unions. There is no 
such provision in the Administration bill. 
4. Requiring both unions and employers to bargain collectively 
in good faith. The Administration measure requires that only of 
employers. 
5. The filing of non-Communist affidavits, by both un on 
officers and employers. The Administration bill requires no such oaths. 
96 
The Boston Globe, June 8, 1949, p. 1 
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I 
These five amendments were whipped ~p in the preceding few 
days Qy Douglas, Hill, Humphrey, Thomas, Garret Withers of Kentucky 
and Republicans Aiken of Vermont and Morse of Oregon. The aim, of 
course, was to win over liberal Republicans and Moderate Southerners, 
. . 
as it appeared certain that the key votes in the Senate would be very 
close and would hinge on these men. 
Before going into the voting on the Sen~te floor, it is 
interesting to note that an attempt was .made by the Republicans to 
/ postpone debate on changing the Taft-Hartley law so that debate and 
ratification of the Atlantic Pact in the interest of "national security" 
' 
could take place first. 97 This could have conceivably resulted in the 
. ~ 
I ' disappearance of labor legislation in the last minute rush to adjourn. 
Meanwhile, the Republican Policy Committee and' Senator Taft 
have not been idle. The Taft plan, )adopted by the Republic~ committee, 
h~s as its key provision the power of the President to get an- injunction 
or to seize the plant in a national emergP.ncy strike. 98 J The new bi-
partisan plan of liberal temocrats and Republicans, discussed above, 
also provided for seizure, but with a basic difference. The Taft 
seizure plan is what is known as "token" seizure. That is, the 
government takes over in n~e, and the American flag is placed at the 
door. However, only the plant owners are allowed to negotiate with 
the un~on, with the government merely assuring the continued operation 
of the plant, and holding the owner's profits in reserve for his return. 
97Facts on File Yearbook, 1949, p.l79 
I 98 
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bipartisan group. On the same day, the free speech, requirement to 
ba~gain , and the Communist affidavit amendments were introduced by 
the bipartisan group. The rest of the week consisted of talk. 
The following week the Administration officially accepted the 
three amendments introduced by the bipartisan group, plus the finan~ 
cial statement amendment, and witha change in the Communist affidavit 
I' amendment to incl ude Fascists.102 These four amendments were easily 
passed, with Taft taunting the Administration that it was coming closer 
and closer to the acceptance of the Taft-Hartley Law. The Senate 
waited for the crucial fight over the injunction, which began on 
Thursday, June 16, 1949. After preliminary discussion, it was obvious 
that the Administration was willing to accept the one remaining bi-
partisan amendment, in which the President would have the right to 
seize struck plants with the implied right to o erate the plant as if 
the government were the owner. Senator Withers, Democrat of Kentucky 
thought that Presidential seizure carried with it the implied right to 
enjoin strikes, but Morse vigorously opposed this,10is did Taft. 
Morse wanted the government barred from issuing injunctions in any 
labor dispute, and stated that the Norris-Laguardia Act would be ap-
plicable to the government unless Congress provided otherwise in 
specific cases .~ Only Congres5. under his proposal, would authorize 
Presidential seizure by case. I t is interesting to note here More ~ 
statement that he considered the right to strike so important that 
102 c Congressional Record. Eighty-First ongress, First Session, Vol. 95,p.78 
lOJ Facts. on File Yearbook, 1949, p. 188 

to pass the Taft injunction-seizure amendment 50-40.106 Two days 
later it accepted the Taft omnibus amendment , 49-45.107 Then it 
went through the motions of passing the "repeal" bill, 51-42.108 
The Taft-Hartley Law was thus "repealed" by the Senate, but with 
the full set of new Taft provisions. 
There were a few other votes which were taken which were 
not part of the main stream of voting. Senator Ives, New York 
Republican, offered an amendment providing f or neither injunction 
nor seizure, but requiring the President to refer individual "national 
emergency" strikes to Congress for action. This was offered for the 
second time right'after the defeat of the Lucas motion, but was de-
109 feated, 51-40, though it had Administration support. 
At the start of the above day's voting, the Administration had 
won its only victory when an amendment by Democratic Senator Holland 
of Florida to write injunctions but not seizure into the Administration 
bill was beaten, 54-37.110 The Senate then went on to the Lucas, Taft, 
and Ives amendments. 
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Congressional Record, op. cit., Vol. 95, p. 8668 
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The Final Taft Bill. 
Let us now look at the main provisions of the Taft Bill 
(born Thomas and remaining so in name only) which had been passed 
by the Senate, and which preserves all of the essential revisions 
of the Taft-Hartley Law. The Taft Bill 1-rould: 1) Authorize sixty-
day injunctions and/or plant seizures in national emergency strikes. 
2) Continue the authorization of injunctions in unfair labor practice 
cas .-s, but make them non-mandatory. 3) Extend the requirement of 
filing non-Communist affidavits to employers as well as union 
officers. 4) Make both unions and management file financial data. 
5) Continue the closed shop ban, but l et unions refer qualified 
workers for jobs. 6) Abolish union shop elections. 7) Continue the 
ban on secondary boycotts , but allow boycotts on work farmed out by 
struck plants. 8) Continue the mass picketing ban. 9) Require 
both unions and management to bar ain. 10) Make it unnecess :try for 
employers to bargain with foremen. 11) Continue free speech guaran-
tees in unfair labor practice but not in representation cases. 
12) Continue union liability for damages in breach of contract in-
volving jurisdictional strikes, secondary bvycotts, and acts of its 
agents. 13) Permit featherbedding. 14) Ban strikes by federal 
workers. 15) N. L. R. B. General Counsel' independence of the 
• L. R. B. 16) Continue the Federal 1edia tion and Conciliation 
Service as a separate independent agency. 
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but it abolishes the separate Office of General Coun;el. 
Another one of Mr. Mosher's "external obstacles" ref~rs to 
the existence of unions which function beyond a sing e plant. This 
• A. M. desire to eliminate all unions functioning on an inter-plant 
to an international level means full backing for any measures ·hich 
severely limit or destroy the powers of such unions. Although the 
Ei hty-First Congress did not seriously consider legislation to end 
industry-wide bargaining, it did in many instances provide measures 
to cripple national unions. In this category are the injunctive 
provisions and the secondary boycott provisions in the ood, Sims, 
and Taft Bills. Much milder anti-boycott provisions are to be found 
in the Lesinski and Thomas Bills. As for the banning of industry-
wide bargaining itself, the attem t to do this had been made in the 
Eightieth Congress . At that time, 0ne of the first amendments 
offered from the floor to the bill reported out by the Senate Labor 
Committee was an amendment by Senator Taft to end industry-wide 
113 
bargaining. This was defeated by the m£rgin of one vote. In 
the House, the ~riginal Hartley Bill had banned most industry-wide 
. 114 bargaming. In the Eighty-First Congress, however, a little more 
moderation prevailed, as no Congressional group urged the break-up 
of industrial unions. Evidently, November 1948, had done some good. 
113 
See above, p. 11 
114 
See above, p. 10 
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To continue ·~th the correlation of the legislation with Mr. 
Mosher'a testimony, Mosher next referred to union objectives which 
he considers to be "not in the best interests of employees". Into 
this category is thrown all union security measures.115 On this matter 
we have the out-lawing of the closed shop in the Wood, )ims , and Taft 
Bills (though some loopholes were provided). Requests of theN. A. M. 
to outlaw the union shop, however , have not been followed. Also in 
this category of unfair unionism is the jurisdictional strike. All 
bills proposed this on this matter have agreed with theN. A. M. , 
since they outlaw that type df strike. 
Finally, Mr. Mosher st~tes his objections to the inequities 
of "one-sided obli ations" under the law. Connected with this in the 
Wood, Sims, and Taft Bills is the stipulation for the right of free 
speech for em loyers during labor disputes. This means , p esumably, 
that the company may now propagandize their workers on management's 
position in the strike . Req'lirement .for unions to bargain in good 
faith is also in the Wood, Sims , and Taft Bills. In those bills , 
also, is th~ principle of the legal res onsibility of the unions 
for the actions of their members . This means, of course , that the 
unions are liable to suit in the courts for breach of contract by the union 
115 
The following year , Mr. Mosher ~~s backed up in this be ore the 
"vatchdog" committee by Schroeder of the Associated Industries of 
Minneapolis, Stuart of Quaker Oats , as well as Logan of the Associ ted 
Industries of Missouri. (Congr~ssional Joint Committee on Labor-
Management Relations , Hearin0 s, Eightieth Congress , Second Session, 
arts 1 and 2 . ) 
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predominant. This is especially true of the Wood Bill. Before it 
was amended somewhat, that Bill not only incorporated in it the 
principle features of the Taft-Hartley, but it also included some 
N. A. M. recommendations for increasing the restricted features of 
that law. Although amendments later slightly modified the drastic 
nature of the Wood Bill, it was still an expression of many N. A. M. 
wishes. But even the Wood Bill did not go as far as the N. A. M. 
desired, especially in the areas of industry-wide bargaining and 
employee-benefit plans. 
Sincerity of the N. A. M. 
We may now again ask the question, as we did after the hedrings 
before the Eightieth Congress, as to whether the N. ~. M. is sincere 
in its statements that what it is trying to do is to improve "real" 
collectiv~ bargaining. Senator Thomas of Utah, present. chairman of 
the Labor Committee of the Senate, and leader of the minority on the 
committee during the Eightieth Congress hearings, has an interesting 
answer to this question, which he arrived at after listening to days 
of N. A. M. testimony. 116 He felt that despite their supposed 
devotion to the cause of collective bargaining, there is some reason 
to examine the sincerity of their recommendations. For example, 
Charles Wilson of General Electric was accompanied and advised in 
his testimony by Anderson, his personnel director, who, according 
116 
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to testimony before the Senate Civil Liberties Committee, was in 
direct charge of the General Electric corps of detectives used in 
strike-breaking, and who destroyed evidence in the form of records 
wanted by the committee. He also announced his intention of con-
timuing to employ detectives for such activities. The fact that 
Anderson is still employed by General Electric tends to indicate 
a continuation of former policy by G. E. One may suspect, therefore, 
that the recommendations of this corporation to the Labor Committee 
had as its purpose the reacquiring of old methods of pursuing anti-
labor activities. They want a law which will make it possible for 
them to use such methods again. 
Another gentleman that Mr. Thomas mentions is Reed of 
Weirton Steel, who also wanted merely to perf~ct collective bargain-
ing. In the period before World War II, after the passage of the 
Wagner Aet, Weirton Steel Company spent $11, 778~17 for industrial 
munitions, as well as hiring strike-breaking agencies.117 These 
practices are hardly in the direction of true collective bargaining, 
since they indicate the company's intention to maintain their stand 
by force. 
Another one that testified was Storey of Allis-Chalmers. 
Again the committee was assured of his devotion to the principle 
of collective bargaining. Senator Thomas, however, maintained that 
117 
Senate Report Number Six, Part Three, Seventy-Sixth Congress, 
First Session, pp.62,63,77,and 204 
he also was a strike breaker before World War II. Then there was 
a vice-president of the Chrysler Corporation, also a great believer 
in collective bargaining, who had said publicly even after the 
passage of the Wagner Aet that he would .bargain with unions fo~ their 
own members only, even though the union had a majority .in the plant. 
The Chrysler Company is another purchaser of industrial munitions. 
fn 1935 alone, for example, it bought$7,000 worth of material from 
118 
the Lake Erie Chemical Corporation. Finall~, we have Ira Mosher, 
himself, who , as Vice-President of the American Optical Company, 
also purchased industrial munitions from L~ke Erie Chemical. He 
was the one who was personally in charge of industrial munitions 
for the company in 1935.119 
As Senator Thomas says, "These are not very clean hands with 
which to come before a Senate committee with legislative recommenda-
120 
tions. 11 Bills such as tne Taft Bill will gradually allow these 
"" 
conditions to return, not because it expressly provides for them, 
but because it provides the opportunity for advantage-takers to 
get started. 
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First Session, pp. 46, 55,66, 138, 195 
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The Taft-Hartley Act may not be a "slave-labor" act in the 
strictest sense of the term, but it can lead to conditions closely 
akin to slavery. The Taft-Hartley guarantee of the right of workers 
to quit their job may prove meaningless under an economic situation 
where to quit means to starve, as is the case in a depression. 
Thus, in time of depression, employers will be free to practice 
their union-destroying techniques under the benevolence of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. 
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-CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
There has been a high degree of correlation between N. A. M. 1 s 
ideas on proper labor relations and recent labor legislation in Con-
gres. We have observed this through an analysis of the Taft*Hart-
ley Law and recent bills attempting to repeal it, plus a comparison 
with an analysis of N. A. M. desires as expressed in testimony to 
Congress, as well as official pronouncements. 
In testifying before Congressional committees previous to 
the passage of the Taft-Hartley Law, N. A. M. representatives expressed 
a desire for such legislation as the banning of the closed shop, 
industry-1-ride bargaining, jurisdictional and sympathy strikes, &.nd 
secondary boycotts, making unions liabls to damage suits and in-
junctions, and other restrictive legislation against labor unions. 
Congress accepted these recommendations, and many were incorporated 
into law. 
During the fight to pass the Taft-Hartley Law, N. A. M. 
proposals cropped up time after time, to be passed by resounding 
margins. N. A. M. influence was particularly effective in the 
Republican Party and among the Southern Democrats, and was also more 
effective in the House than in the Senate. Only a coalition of 
Liberal Democrats and Republicans in the Senate on some key issues 
prevented complete N. A. M. program from being enacted into law. 
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The Hartley Bill did incorporate at one stage or another all of the 
major points of theN. A. M., but was somewhat modified by the 
Senate Bill. The final Taft-Hartley Act, however, was basically 
the Hartley Bill, and bore a very close resemblance to N. A. M. 
proposals. 
The Taft-Hartley Act also was in close agreement with the 
official N. A. M. platform, as expressed at their 1946 convention. 
This platform, more general in nature than the testimony given by 
Ira Mosher and others before Congress, embodied the idea that 
union "bosses" worked against the best interests of employer, em-
ployee, and the public. It stressed the individual's right to act 
as an individual. This same basic idea is to be found in the Taft-
Hartley Act, in such proVisions as the barring of the closed shop, 
replacing of restrictions on the union shop, and the careful 
Federal scrutiny of union affairs. 
Not only was there a similarity between N. A. M. and Taft-
Hartley principles, but in some instances phraseology appeared to 
be duplicated. According to evidence obtained by the unions, this 
was due to the fact that theN. A. M. actually participated in the 
drawing up of the Hartley Bill. 
After the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, N. a . M. 
testimony again found willing ear~ the "watchdog" committee. 
N. A. M. desires which were left out of Taft-Hartley were once 
again urged. Indications that these suggestions were being 
favorably considered came to naught with the election of 194S, 
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when Truman was elected on a "repeal Taft-Hartley" platform. 
In the Eighty-First Congress , the success of theN. A. M. 
in instilling a large part of its philoso~hy into the Taft-Hartley 
Law was heavily underlined by its brilliant success in hel ing to 
prevent the repeal of that Law, even thou h its rinci les were 
presumed to have been defeated at the olls. Once again, N. A. M. 
princirles turned up in varying degrees in most of the "re ea1Pr 11 
bills end amendments presented to Congress. Some bills, such as 
the original Wood Bill, were more closely ali ~ed to N. A. M. 
rinciples than the Taft-Hartley Law was, incorporating some sug-
gestions made before the "watchdog" committee. The final outcome 
left the Taft-Hartley still on the books, and the Administration 
considered itself lucky at thatt 
We may conclude further from the above that the N. A. M. 
has proven itself a pressure group which carries far more weight 
than its size justifies numerically. It is its tremGndous 
economic ower and restige that earns it votes in Congress. It 
has buried its anti-union principles deep on Ca~itol Hill. The 
recent unsuccessful fight of the Truman Administration on the 
floor of Congress underscores the difficulties involved in up-
rooting those princi les. 
II 
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APPENDIX 
THE BASIC PRINCIPLES BEHIND GOOD EMPLOYEE RELATIONS AND SOUND 
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (l946) 
A Report by the Industrial Relations Program Committe of the 
National Association of Manufacturers 
Approved by the Board of Directors, Vecember 3, 1946 
••• The right of employees to join or not to join a union should be 
protected by law. In exercising the right to organize in unions or 
the right not to organize , employees should be protected by law against 
coercion from any source. 
1. The union as well as the employer should be oblig&ted by law, 
to bargain collectively in good faith, provided that a majority of the 
employees in the appropriate unit wish to be represented by the union. 
2. The union as well as the employer should be .obligated, by 
law, to adhere to the terms of collective bargaining agreements . 
Collective bargaining agreements should provide that ais; utes arising 
over the meaning or interpretation of a provision should be settled 
by peaceful procedures. 
3. Monopolistic practice~ in restraint of trade are inherently 
contrary to the public interest, and should be prohibited to labor 
unions as ,.,ell as to employers. It is just as contrary to the 
public interest for a union or unions representing the employees of 
two or more employers to take joint w~ge action or engage ii other 
75. 
monopolistic practices as it is for two or more employers to take 
joint price action or enga6 e in other monopolistic practices. 
4 ... the protection of law should be extended to strikers only 
when the majority of employees in the bargaining unit, by secret 
ballot under impartial supervision, have voted for a strike in pre-
ference to acceptance of thelatest offer of the employer. Employees 
and employers should both be protected in their right to express their 
respective positions. 
5. No strike should have the protection of law if it involves 
issues which do not relate to wages, hours or working conditions, 
or demands which the employer is powerless to grant. Such issues 
and demands are involved in jurisdictional strikes, sympathy strikes, 
strikes against the government, strikes t o force employers to ignore 
or viol~ te the law, strikes to force recognition of an uncertified 
union, strikes to enforce featherbedding or other work-restricted 
demands, or second~ry boycotts. 
6. No individual should be deprived of his right to work at 
an available job, ••• Mass picketing and any other form of coercion 
or intimidation should be prohibited. 
7. Employers should not be required to bargain collectively 
with foremen or other representatives of management. 
8. No employee or prospective employee should be re~uired to 
join or to·refrain from j oining a union, or to maintain or withdraw 
his membership in a union, as a condition of employment. Compulsory 
union membership and interference with voluntary union membership 
76. 
both should be prohibited by law. 
9 •..• The preservation of free collective bargaining demands 
that gover-nment intervention in labor disputes be reduced to an 
absolute minimum. 
·-
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